

## Watery Eyes: Resource Conflicts in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Mexico

### *The cases of Mexico City and Sonora*

**Abstract:** The investigation focuses on two conflicts of water supply in the decade of 2010 in Mexico. *Independencia* Aqueduct supplies Hermosillo – a city of more than 700 000 inhabitants, capital of the state of Sonora – amidst protests from indigenous Yaqui farmers in the sense that it threatens their traditional way of life, as it resulted in water scarcity. The second case is a potential water pipe network aimed to help the locals, but feared to end up as a way to transfer water from the low-income village of San Bartolo Ameyalco to the well-appointed area of Santa Fé (both in Mexico City), triggering strong and violent opposition from the villagers. Both conflicts are placed and examined within the social, economic and political context of present day Mexico, using content and comparative analyses. Finally, in order to have a broader perspective, a brief comparison is offered between these Mexican cases and possibly the most well-known water conflict in Latin America, the *Water War* of Bolivia (Cochabamba, 1999-2000). The investigation relies on statistical sources; Mexican and international media, as well as academic writings in English and Spanish.

**Keywords:** water scarcity, water war, inequality, State, indigenous people

This paper examines two conflicts of water supply in the decade of 2010 in Mexico. The first takes us to the state of Sonora where *Independencia* Aqueduct was built to supply Hermosillo – the state capital – amidst protests from indigenous Yaqui farmers because it threatens their traditional way of life and survival. The second case is a potential water pipe network supposedly aimed to help the locals, but feared to end up as a way to transfer water from the low-income San Bartolo Ameyalco to the well-appointed area of Santa Fé (both in Mexico City), triggering strong and violent opposition. Both conflicts are placed and studied within the social, economic and political context of present day Mexico. First they are examined individually, then analysed together and compared to what is at present possibly the best-known water conflict connected to Latin America: the *Water War* of Cochabamba (1999-2000).

The investigation is based on statistical sources; Mexican and international media, principally press, as well as academic writings in English and Spanish. Content analysis and comparisons were the principal methodological tools used, with the aim of providing an in-depth study of two relatively little known, yet important, water resource conflicts.

#### Case 1: Context and Background

The state of Sonora is located in north-western Mexico. It is the second biggest federal unit in the country after Chihuahua, with an area of 179 355 km<sup>2</sup>. With respect to climate, 48% of it is described as dry or semi-dry, and 46.5% as very dry. The average annual rainfall is 450 mm, and it is concentrated in summer. The number of Sonorenses is 2.85 million (Encuesta intercensal, 2015), of which approximately 2.3% belong to the indigenous Yaqui (Lutz - Curl, 2015: 2).

The Yaqui have a long tradition of struggle, trying to defend their territory first against the Spanish crown, then against the Mexican State. One of their worst periods was during the Porfiriato – an era between 1877 and 1911, named after dictator Porfirio Díaz – when the central government attempted to eliminate the tribe, recurring, for example, to deportations to the southern parts of the country, selling the Yaqui as workforce on plantations. The Yaquis dwindled in numbers but did not disappear. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 tried to destroy the old system in order to make the foundation of a new Mexico possible. The Yaquis participated supporting Álvaro Obregón, in order to get back their traditional land. When this promise faded away, revolted. The last rebellion took place in the second half of the 1920s, and was put down with the deployment of 20 000 soldiers and the bombarding of tribal areas (Moctezuma, 2007: 8-10). Leaders were imprisoned, the area

was militarized but real peace was only achieved about ten years later, when, via presidential decree, Lázaro Cárdenas gave back approximately 30% of its original territory to the tribe and granted them the right to 50% of the water in Yaqui River (Moctezuma, 2007: 10-11). According to Lutz - Curl, the mean annual flow of the Yaqui River is 2 800 million cubic meters (2015: 1).

Problems soon appeared due to the construction of dams in the water basin of Yaqui River: Lázaro Cárdenas Dam / La Angostura (1942); Álvaro Obregón Dam / El Oviáchic (1952) and midway between the previous two: Plutarco Elías Calles Dam, also called El Novillo (1969). Geographically, La Angostura is the northernmost, and is located on Bavispe River – a tributary of Yaqui River – and has a capacity of 880 million cubic metres. More downstream, El Novillo is situated at the confluence of Yaqui and Moctezuma Rivers and has a capacity of 2 799 million cubic meters. El Oviáchic is even more to the south, and can store up to 2 782 million cubic meters (Lutz – Curl, 2015: 1). The three dams made it possible to add 181 000 hectares for agricultural use (Evans, 2006: 48). Nowadays the state of Sonora is one of the main producers of wheat, grapes, asparagus and potatoes in Mexico. Other important crops include tomatoes, watermelons, muskmelons, cucumbers, pumpkins, oranges, cotton, etc. The cultivated area makes up only 2.6% of that of the whole country, but the related income which reached 20 600 000 000 of pesos – 7% of value of the national product –, placed the state in third place within Mexico in 2010 (Sagarpa, 2011). In the agricultural year of 2013, the income amounted to 27 125 280 000 pesos (INEGI, c. 2014).

All the dams are located before “the territory – known variously as the *Yaqui Zona Indígena* (Indigenous Zone), the *Reserva Yaqui* (Yaqui Reserve), or the *Comunidades Yaquis* (Yaqui Communities) – [that] encompasses 485 000 hectares of land and is located 400 kilometres directly south of the international border separating Sonora from Arizona” (Erickson, 2008: 8). Most Yaquis live in this area, although some of them have moved to nearby cities such as Guaymas, Ciudad Obregón and Hermosillo, and there are diaspora groups in the Yucatan peninsula as well as in the southern parts of the United States, in Arizona.

The dams affected profoundly the lives of the Yaqui. The flow of the Yaqui River dwindled, the proportion of water used by the three dams was estimated to exceed 95% (Hopkins, 2012: 6). The situation got worse in the 1990s with the construction of the Yaqui River-Guaymas aqueduct – inaugurated in 1993 – that supplies the port of Guaymas 437 litres per second with the water of the river (Márquez, 2014); and the expropriation of 45 000 hectares of Yaqui territory by presidential decree (*La Cuchilla*) in 1997 (García, 2005). In order to stay within the indigenous zone, inhabitants had to abandon the traditional settlements of Cócorit and Bácum<sup>1</sup> and move to the west bank of the dry river-bed (Hopkins, 2012: 8-9). Now only a canal with a narrow thread of water gets to the tribal area (Olvera, 2016).

Yields dropped, and Yaqui farmers had to buy water, resulting in increasing indebtedness. Nowadays it is not uncommon that Yaquis, instead of cultivating the land they have, (but that has turned inept for agriculture), are picked up on a daily basis and work as labourers on the fields of others, in general not belonging to their group. The Yaqui population has thus grown increasingly marginalized.

Let us examine one of the smaller settlements: Huiribis (Guaymas) in 2010. It had 342 dwellers, 337 of which, altogether 98.5%, were born there. Their average years of schooling slightly passed six; being 5.76 for men and a little bit higher, 6.56, for women. 72 of the 78 houses of the village were inhabited. None of them had sewerage or a fixed telephone line. There was one computer, 23 cars / trucks and 35 mobile phones. Communication with the outside world must have been difficult. One of the principal sources of news has been – unfortunately – the television. There were 57 television sets in Huiribis in 2010, and only 36 fridges, despite extremely hot temperatures (INEGI, 2010).

General statistics on Yaquis are difficult to find. Accounts made principally by journalists and anthropologists, however, reveal a precarious situation, associated with desertification, pauperization, unemployment and lack of access to basic services, including safe drinking water. “High levels of multiple pesticides were found in the cord blood of new-borns and in breast milk” (Guillette, 1998: 347) of Yaqui living in agricultural areas (1990) due to exposure to chemicals such as DDT.

<sup>1</sup> Cócorit and Bácum were two of the eight sacred villages, considered to be of outstanding importance by the Yaqui. The others are Belem, Huiribis, Rahum, Pótam, Tórim y Vícam.

Infant mortality in Mexico, estimated to be 17 per 1000 live births, was 16.4 per 100 (!) among the Yaqui in 2005 – that is 164 per 1000 live births –, almost *ten times higher than the national average* (Hopkins, 2012: 10).

#### Recent conflict

Due to water shortages in Hermosillo, capital of the state of Sonora, the federal government made a decision in 2010 to construct a pipeline from the Plutarco Elías Calles Dam / El Novillo to supply the city's growing population and also possibly with the aim of attracting more foreign investment. Water scarcity has been a serious limitation on the industrial development of the city. Yet, together with the birth of the project *Sonora Sí* – including the pipeline – the activities of multinationals intensified in Hermosillo. For instance, the Mexican-Swiss cement producer, Holcim Apasco, invested more than 400 million dollars to build a new factory, with a capacity of 1.6 million tonnes of cement a year (Holcim, 2010). Another example is Ford, that amplified its already existing car factory in Hermosillo, inverting 1 370 million dollars (Rubio, 2012).

The pipeline, called *Independencia* Aqueduct, was inaugurated in 2012, and started to function in April, 2013. It works like “a giant straw” connected to the base of the Novillo Dam (Hopkins, 2012:10), with the capacity of 75 million cubic metres a year. It is approximately 150 km long, and “once it is fully functional, it will become the largest trans-boundary cross-border basin transfer in the history of North America” (Hopkins, 2013: 6), joining the Sonora basin (where Hermosillo is situated) with the Rio Yaqui basin. The money spent on the construction of the pipeline almost reached 4 000 millions of pesos (Olvera, 2016b; Lutz-Curl, 2015: 2) and its total operational cost is estimated to exceed \$1 billion U.S. dollars (Hopkins, 2013: 6).

The Yaqui tribe protested, turning to, among others, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) and the Mexican judicial system, the case finally reaching the Supreme Court. At present the aqueduct is still working, despite the rulings of the Court, the recommendations of the IACHR and a change in the political leadership of the state of Sonora with Claudia Pavlovich (PRI) assuming governorship in September, 2015. What is more, a gas line that connects Guaymas, Sonora and El Oro, Sinaloa – having an 80-km-long section in the tribal area (Olvera, 2016a) – is being built by Gasoducto Aguaprieta, a member of the IEnova Group, despite Yaqui protests, and is planned to be in operation from August 2016.

The official narrative does not seem to change (discrimination; stereotyping the Yaquis as obstacles to progress; ignorance of the indigenous zone and tribal rights that are supposed to go related to it; criminalization of protests, intimidation, etc.) The Yaquis, personified by the Deer Dancer on the coat of arms of Sonora, are considered and treated as a nuisance.

#### Case 2: Context and Background

This conflict takes us to Mexico City, to the Delegación Álvaro Obregón, on the southern part of the capital, made up of units of very different socio-economic levels, such as the low-income San Bartolo Ameyalco, and the posh Santa Fé, known for its skyscrapers, an area that houses the biggest commercial center of the country as well as the offices of various national and international companies and exclusive residential areas.

San Bartolo Ameyalco – the name Ameyalco coming from ancient *náhuatl* roots and meaning ‘a place where water springs up’ – is situated in the higher zone of the *Delegación*, and consists of 52 *manzanas* or blocks (Díaz, 2014). It is a place that has been inhabited for centuries precisely due to the presence of water. Sadly enough, despite the spring, nowadays not all households have easy access to water. Some of them have tap-water, while others depend on the service provided by the *pipas*, or water tank trucks run partly by the city and partly by private entrepreneurs. Locals naturally would not mind the improvement of the water system network, but they are afraid that the city and also the national leadership would prioritize the interests of big business over their needs, and the spring water, once tapped, would end up in Santa Fé. The city administration denies this and blames the water truck drivers for misleading the locals, insisting that it is their own economic interest to maintain things unchanged as the improvement of the area with tap-water service would put an end to their business.

### Recent Conflict

San Bartolo Ameyalco appeared in the Mexican news on 21<sup>st</sup> of May, 2014 due to the violent conflict that broke out between the settlers and the armed forces – 1000 *granaderos*,<sup>2</sup> 600 ordinary policemen and 2 helicopters (González, 2014; Tourliere, 2015) – sent to safeguard the continuation of water works, which had been suspended three months earlier on 14<sup>th</sup> February, 2014 due to local pressure. The settlers raised barricades, threw stones and whatever came in their hands, and clashed with the police. More than a hundred people were injured, including civilians and policemen. Factors that could have contributed to the high levels of violence included the overwhelming difference in numbers, the possible involvement of external trouble-makers mixed among the locals to discredit the protest, and the frustration of the people with the city leadership and the police.

The latter is considered to be unreliable and inefficient. The ratio of impunity was estimated to be 98.5% (La impunidad, 2010) in the country. In many cases, police is actually feared, but not by the criminals. A dramatically high percentage, around 90% of Mexicans think that law-enforcement institutions are corrupt or very corrupt. Many have had some direct personal experience, as 61% of the population admitted to have paid a bribe to the police within the span of one year (Global Corruption Barometer, 2013). The poorer the people, the more affected they are by corruption, as it takes away a larger portion of their income (The World Bank 2007:21).

The proportion and the number of the poor are on the rise in Mexico. In 2006, 42.9% of the population lived in poverty, and in 2012, 52.5%; that is, 10% more (The World Bank, 2006, 2012). Taking into account the growing size of the population, the number of the poor increased from 46 million (2006) to 60 million (2012).<sup>3</sup> The poor got more numerous and poorer in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, whereas the rich grew richer. The assets of the four wealthiest Mexicans amounted to 2% of the GDP in 2002. In 2013-14, they reached 9% (Esquivel 2015: 7-8). “Inequality is high, permanent and it is reproduced in the context of low social mobility” (PNUD 2010: abstract).

There has been a general feeling in San Bartolo Ameyalco that the Mexico City leadership, a miniature of the Mexican State in the eyes of the locals, does not work for them, does not represent them. Instead, it acts according to the interests of big business (*captured State*) or, in other words, it works in a disfunctional way, “accompanied by the absence of the rule of law, or the intermittent application of the rule of law.” (Discussion, 2015). A culture of illegality thrives. A lot of people violate the law day by day. They evade taxes, build houses without legal permits, pay bribes but fail to pay for electricity and other services, just to list a few examples. “A *predatory State* generates a predatory population. A State which imparts differential justice produces a population that makes its own choices on how to apply justice. A State that violates the laws engenders a population that does not believe in them” (Dresser, 2015). The credibility gap in present-day Mexico is huge and might still be growing.

### Conclusions and Future Study

The Mexican cases are conflicts between the population and the State, the latter being represented by the federal or the city governments. The root of the problem is the lack of water and the dispute is on how to distribute the available precious resource. What criteria should be taken into account and what priorities should be established? Environmental, demographic, economic and / or cultural? Negotiations for reaching a consensus are seriously hindered by the weakness of the Mexican State and its legitimacy deficit. The conflicts are likely to be prolonged.

In Bolivia, in comparison, the inhabitants of Cochabamba – the fourth largest city in the country, with a population of more than 600 000 people – protested against unaffordable water prices, connected to a multinational company, which took hold of the local water supply system after the government had been forced to introduce austerity measures and cut expenditure, resulting in privatizations. Violent clashes broke out in 2000 between the population and government forces trying

<sup>2</sup> Specially trained policemen, often used in case of mass protests, disturbances, etc.

<sup>3</sup> The Population of Mexico was 107.45 million in 2006 and 116.22 million in the middle of 2013 (CIA, 2006, 2013).



to protect Aguas de Tunari,<sup>4</sup> a subsidiary of the San Francisco-based Bechtel Corporation,<sup>5</sup> resulting in injuries, casualties and considerable material damage.

One of the major differences between the Mexican and the Bolivian resource conflicts was in their impacts. The Mexicans remained local whereas the Bolivian one had a spill-over effect on the whole country contributing to political change.

In the latter case the conflict could not be handled locally. For example the police, sympathizing with the Cochabamba protesters to a considerable degree, was substituted for the army. Furthermore, a state of emergency had to be declared in April, 2000 – another difference from the Mexican cases – that reinforces the idea that protests in Bolivia overpassed local spheres in their implications and rose to national significance. In fact, they must have contributed to the resignation of President Hugo Banzer<sup>6</sup> in 2001 and to the success of Evo Morales, who finally took office in January 2006.

Thanks to the Bolivian Water War, national and international attention was drawn to water issues in general. In the meantime there was also a lot of interest in the happenings in Cochabamba in particular. The water works of the city were renationalized, prices went back to normal, but the prospects of developing and improving the supply system of the city are still bleak. Attention towards Cochabamba has not ceased after the 2000 protests, though naturally was reduced in intensity. Documentaries such as *The Big Sellout*; *Blue Gold: World Water Wars*; *The Corporation* and especially the more popular feature films like the 2008 James Bond movie *Quantum of Solace* as well as the Spanish film *Even the Rain* (2010) – directed by Icair Bollain, starring Luis Tosar and Gael García Bernal – contributed to re-directing attention to Bolivia, and more generally, to water as an essential resource.

The echo of the Mexican protests was much less, and hardly reached the international scene. The controversies around Independencia Aqueduct and the water of San Bartolo Ameyalco were treated as *local* problems, the conflicts of *local* interests, and not as part of a more general issue. Being artificially kept as local, they are more likely to be manipulated and even suppressed. Yet, until no real solution is offered, the problems will continue to exist and protests will surface from time to time. The official handling as well as the prolongation of the conflicts are likely to make those affected disenchanted, disillusioned, and most possibly, scared.

## References

- CIA (2006, 2013). Mexico, The World Factbook 2006, 2013. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C.
- Díaz, Catalina (2014). Agua: clave en el conflicto de San Bartolo Ameyalco, Milenio, 06.05.2014. Retrieved from (02.02.2016) [http://www.milenio.com/df/San\\_Bartolo\\_Ameyalco-Alvaro\\_Obregon-desabasto\\_de\\_agua-vecinos-Leonel\\_Luna\\_0\\_293971018.html](http://www.milenio.com/df/San_Bartolo_Ameyalco-Alvaro_Obregon-desabasto_de_agua-vecinos-Leonel_Luna_0_293971018.html)
- Discussion on Mexican Politics and Economy. Professor Denise Dresser and former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Jim Jones talk about the politics and economy of Mexico. Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network, C-SPAN, 10.08.2015, San Francisco, CA., Retrieved from (12.02.2016) [https://archive.org/details/CSPAN\\_20150810\\_081800\\_Discussion\\_on\\_Mexican\\_Politics\\_and\\_Economy#start/2100/end/2160](https://archive.org/details/CSPAN_20150810_081800_Discussion_on_Mexican_Politics_and_Economy#start/2100/end/2160)
- Dresser, Denise (2015). Mexico Government Corruption Corrodes Citizen Values, Mexico Voices, 27. 07.2015. [Translated by Amanda Moody]. Retrieved from (12.11.2015) <http://mexicovoices.blogspot.hu/2015/07/mexico-government-corruption-corrodes.html?view=sidebar>
- Erickson, Kristin C. (2008). Yaqui Homeland and Homeplace. The Everyday Production of Ethnic Identity, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson.
- Esquivel Hernández, Gerardo (2015). Extreme inequality in Mexico. Concentration of economic and political power. Oxfam, Mexico.
- Evans, Sterling (2006). La Angustia de la Angostura: consecuencias socioambientales por la construcción de presas en Sonora, Signos Históricos, 16, 46-78.
- García Bernal, Cristóbal (2005). Demandan yaquis restitución de 45 mil hectáreas expropiadas en 1997, La Jornada, 15.05.2005. Retrieved from (03.02.2016) <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/05/15/index.php?section=estados&article=035n1est>

<sup>4</sup> Tunari is a mountain next to Cochabamba. It is one of the symbols of the city.

<sup>5</sup> One of the largest private companies in the US, specializing in engineering and construction.

<sup>6</sup> (1926-2002). Banzer ruled Bolivia twice: as head of a military dictatorship in the 1970s; and between 1997 and 2001, after winning the presidential elections. The official reason for his resignation was terminal illness. He had lung cancer, and died in 2002.

- Gasoducto Aguaprieta (2016). Gasoducto Sonora. Retrieved from (22.02.2016) <http://www.gasoductoap.com/gasoducto-sonora-detalles-del-proyecto.html>, 10.02.2016.
- González, Rocío; Servín, Mirna y Cruz, Alejandro (2014). San Bartolo Ameyalco, convertido en polvorín; al menos 110 heridos, La Jornada, 22.05.2014. Retrieved from (07.01.2016) <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/05/22/capital/034n1cap>
- Guillette, Elizabeth A. et al. (1998). An Anthropological Approach to the Evaluation of Preschool Children Exposed to Pesticides in Mexico, *Environmental Health Perspectives*, 106, 347-353.
- Holcim invierte 400 mdd en nueva fábrica, CNN Expansion. Retrieved from (20.02.2016) <http://www.cnnexpansion.com/negocios/2010/09/30/holcim-invierte-400-mdd-en-nueva-fabrica>
- Hopkins, James (2012). Presentación al Comité sobre la eliminación de la discriminación racial por las autoridades tradicionales de los pueblos Río Yaqui en relación a los informes periódicos decimosexto y decimoséptimo de México, 31.01.2012. Tucson, Arizona.
- Hopkins, James (2013). Request for Consideration of the Situation of the Traditional Authorities of the Río Yaqui Pueblos, the Río Yaqui Valley, Sonora, Mexico, under the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination's Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures, August 2013, unedited, draft. Retrieved from (20.02.2016) [http://indigenouspeoplesdevelopment.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Urgent\\_Action\\_Draft\\_August\\_7.doc](http://indigenouspeoplesdevelopment.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Urgent_Action_Draft_August_7.doc)
- INEGI (2010). Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Censo General de Población y Vivienda. Principales resultados por localidad (ITER). INEGI, Mexico. Retrieved from (23.02.2016) <http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/iter/default.aspx?ev=5>
- INEGI (c. 2014). *Anuario estadístico y geográfico de Sonora* 2014. INEGI, Mexico.
- INEGI (2015). Encuesta intercensal, Retrieved from (10.02.2016) [http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/ei2015/doc/eic\\_2015\\_presentacion.pdf](http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/ei2015/doc/eic_2015_presentacion.pdf)
- La impunidad en México alcanza al 98.5% de los delitos. (2010). Informador, 07.11.2010. <http://www.informador.com.mx/mexico/2010/247146/6/la-impunidad-en-mexico-alcanza-al-985-de-los-delitos.htm>, web 2011.12.20.
- Lutz, América – Curl, Kate (2015). Panorama de la Cuenca del Río Yaqui, Inter-American Institute: Center for Water Security. Retrieved from (04.02.2016.) <http://aquasec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/YaquiFactSheet-EnglishFINAL.pdf>
- Márquez Roon, Antonio (2014). Cumple acueducto Río Yaqui-Guaymas 21 años en operación, Radio FM105, 08.08.2014. Retrieved from (04.02.2016) <http://fm105.com.mx/noticias/local/notalocal.php?dID=665706107>
- Moctezuma Zamarrón, José Luis (2007). *Yaquis. Pueblos Indígenas del México Contemporáneo*, CDI, Mexico.
- Olvera, Aldabi (2016). Yaquis de Belem-Pitahaya se manifiestan contra inicio de trabajos de gasoducto, Másde131, Colectivo informativo por internet. Retrieved from (04.02.2016) <http://masde131.com/2016/01/videos-yaquis-de-belem-pitahaya-se-manifiestan-contra-inicio-de-trabajos-de-gasoducto/> [referred to as Olvera, 2016a]
- Olvera, Aldabi (2016). Yaquis: El destino de un río, el destino de una tribu (Parte 1), Másde131, Colectivo informativo por internet. Retrieved from (04.02.2016) <http://masde131.com/2016/01/yaquis-el-destino-de-un-rio-el-destino-de-una-tribu-parte-1/> [referred to as Olvera 2016b]
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2010). Informe Regional sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Latina y el Caribe 2010: Actuar sobre el futuro: romper la transmisión intergeneracional de la desigualdad. PNUD, San José.
- Rubio, Francisco (2012). Ford invierte 1,370 mdd en Hermosillo, CNN Expansion. Retrieved from (10.01.2016) <http://www.cnnexpansion.com/negocios/2012/03/30/ford-invierte-1370-mdd-en-hermosillo>, 08.02.2016.
- Sagarpa (2011). Es Sonora el mayor exportador de productos agropecuarios y pesqueros del país, 25.10.2011. SAGARPA, Retrieved from (08.02.2016) <http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/Delegaciones/sonora/boletines/Paginas/B0822011.aspx>
- Secretaría de Educación Pública (2011): *Libro Estratégico Estatal*. Sonora 2010. SEP, Mexico.
- Tourliere, Mathieu (2015). San Bartolo Ameyalco: sin agua ni justicia, Proceso, 06.03.2015. Retrieved from (10.02.2016) <http://www.proceso.com.mx/397706/san-bartolo-ameyalco-sin-agua-ni-justicia>
- Transparency International (2013). Global Corruption Index. National Results, Mexico. Retrieved from (22.01.2016) <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=mexico>
- The World Bank (2006-2012). Poverty and Inequality Database, Poverty headcount ratio. Retrieved from (28.01.2016) <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/MEX>
- The World Bank (2007). *Democratic Governance in Mexico: Beyond State Capture and Social Polarization*. Mexico.